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0.1. Delimitation of the research topic 
 This thesis, comprised of two papers and a framing introduction, concerns semiotic 
modeling of direct perception of the environment with a two-fold aim: first, to use a 
consistent methodological approach in each paper toward the testing and redefining of 
semiotic models, and second, to develop on the topic further in the introduction by specifying 
semiotic concepts for the study of direct perception. Direct perception is defined by James J. 
Gibson (1986) in ecological psychology as immediate perception of the environment, as 
contrasted with mediated perception via symbolic depictions such as pictures, verbal 
descriptions, and narratives, or tools that enhance our perception such as microscopes or 
telescopes. The common methodological approach used in each paper is an ad hoc approach 
that treats the research object as a subject by evaluating the relevance of the theories 
considered, then explicitly appropriating the chosen theories to the particularities of the 
research object. Such an approach is described by Peeter Torop (2014) as one used toward 
dynamic research objects, or research objects with low analyzability. This methodology is 
also a marker of the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, discussed by Torop as Juri Lotman’s 
movement toward the model of the semiosphere in regards to the dynamic object of culture 
(ibid). This methodology is important, as it allows the researcher to be receptive to the 
dynamic research object. The final development in the introduction, specifying four semiotic 
concepts, is essentially a clarification of semiotic metalanguage at an abstract level of 
analysis. 
 The first paper contains an analysis of human perception of a specific, named stretch 
of river from the functional point of view of a whitewater raft guide. This paper 
experimentally applies Lotman’s early, more structural theory of text in order to reveal 
similarities and differences from traditional applications of text, and to make the appropriate 
modifications to the metalanguage in the context of the new research object. The second 
paper is at a more general level of perception that is not species-specific, and critically 
examines the applicability of concepts from structural linguistics to perception. This paper 
brings forth the theories of Jakob von Uexküll and Gregory Bateson in the enhancement of a  
metalanguage that could apply to communication and interaction across multiple species. In 
both papers, perception is regarded as an act (sometimes referred to by the author as 
functional perception) and the subject and environment are treated as an indivisible unit. This 
kind of approach is employed by Jakob von Uexküll, James Gibson, Gregory Bateson, and 
Tim Ingold, whose works are drawn from in the papers.  
0.2. Context and overview of research in the field 
 This study is part of a larger ongoing search in the environmental humanities for 
suitable research concepts and methods that transcend traditional dichotomies of nature/
culture, mental/material, etc. This section will touch upon specifically semiotic approaches to 
perception, followed by research in the context of each paper. The first paper is more relevant 
in the emerging field of landscape semiotics, as it combines structural and perceptual models 
to a particular stretch of river as framed by the activity of whitewater rafting. The second 
paper ultimately specifies the role and concept of learning in relation to Uexküll’s umwelt 
theory. This finds significance in the field of ecosemiotics, a field that has become more 
defined since 1998, when two papers were published in English on the topic in Sign Systems 
Studies (vol. 26) by Kalevi Kull (1998) and Winfried Nöth (1998). This paper especially 
relates to an ecosemiotic approach as described by Lindström et al. (2014: 123) as one 
concerning “environmental design by organisms” via distinctions organisms make, 
intentionality and learning of the organisms, “communication and its role at all levels of 
living systems”, etc.  
 Uexküll’s umwelt theory and concept of functional cycle is foundational for a 
semiotic approach to perception of the environment and is the central topic of the second 
paper of this thesis. Originally inspired by Uexküll’s approach, perceptual models have also 
been well-developed by Thomas A. Sebeok, the founder of zoosemiotics and catalyst for the 
emergence of biosemiotics. In response to the modeling theories of Lotman, Sebeok and 
others suggest the primacy of a zoosemiotic modeling system underlying a secondary 
linguistic modeling system and a tertiary cultural modeling system (for example, Sebeok and 
Danesi 2000; Sebeok 1994). In a parallel manner, Alf Hornborg outlines three types of human 
sign systems toward perception of the natural environment: the phenomenological or 
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unconscious layer from which only a fraction can be codified linguistically, the linguistic 
layer which includes metaphors and taxonomies (anything that can be conveyed through 
language), and economic sign systems, or the most detached type of sign systems from the 
environment (2001). John Deely, a close associate of Sebeok, contributes works extending 
and specifying the concept of the human umwelt (e.g. see Deely 2001; 2003; 2005) and also 
devotes much research to the topic of the semiotic threshold, providing a detailed overview of 
this debate in The Basics of Semiotics (1990).  
 Also relevant from the field of semiotics is Almo Farina’s ecofield hypothesis, which 
treats the concept of landscape in terms of a configuration of objects defined by their use in 
relation to organisms (Farina and Belgrano, 2004; 2006). Farina and Napoletano's concept of 
“private landscape” develops this idea further into a perceptual context, which “[…] shifts the 
notion of landscape from the popular notion of a large-scale spatial mosaic to a more dynamic 
entity whose scale and configuration depends both on the organisms being considered and 
their immediate resource requirements” (2010: 181). Anthropologist Tim Ingold (2000), 
though not claiming to represent a specifically semiotic approach, should still be mentioned 
in this context, as his pivotal collection of essays on human perception of the environment 
largely draws from the works of Uexküll, Gibson, and Bateson, and he essentially frames 
perception in terms of semiotic activity. 
 In the context of the first paper, contemporary studies of human activity on rivers tend 
to take psychological or phenomenological approaches, focusing on the recreational side of 
the activity. Examples of psychological approaches are prevalent in leisure studies, such as 
Kyle et al. (2004) and Frederickson, Anderson (1999). A phenomenological turn spanning 
multiple disciplines, including the fields of human geography and landscape studies, began to 
treat landscape or environment as a more holistic and corporeal experience (e.g. Christopher 
Tilley’s (1994) phenomenological approach in archaeology; Abram 1996). Phenomenological 
approaches toward rivers include Beck (1987), Krause (2013), Strang (2004, 2005) and 
Suchman (2007). The phenomenological turn was a critical reaction against structural 
approaches and essentially views structural approaches as representational. This paper differs 
by taking a structural approach that is considered to be immediate, rather than mediated, and 
also explicitly draws parameters around the research object at the level of conscious 
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perception, leaving unconscious perception outside the scope of structural analysis. This 
leaves room for a more unconscious and open phenomenological layer of experience that 
would require a different, more flexible metalanguage to describe it. To borrow Hornborg’s 
(2001) typology of economic, linguistic, and phenomenological sign systems, the lattermost 
would be the least abstract layer and the most connected to the environment. 
 The application of text to the river results in a unique combination of structural and 
perceptual models in the context of semiotics as well as other related fields where this has 
been done, namely landscape studies and human geography. Lotman (1990) himself touches 
upon the possibility to apply the notion of text to the city in his analysis of St. Petersburg, but 
he focuses on cultural and symbolic meanings and memory. The structural approach to 
reading the river combines Lotman’s early notion of text with Gibson’s structural approach to 
visual perception, the latter of which treats meaning in terms of affordances discovered by 
subjects through an active process of “information pick-up” (1986: 147). The resulting notion 
of text is different in that it is a functional approach that ties actions and orientations of the 
river guides to the features of text that Lotman has pointed out as fundamental to the 
meaning-making process: demarcation, hierarchical structure, and the realization of a system 
of signs (Lotman 1977).  
 Other structural approaches tend to focus on social relations and their embodiment in 
material surroundings (Duncan 1992), or they emphasize the interpretation side in order to 
reveal the diversity of viewpoints (e.g., de Certeau 1984). Anne Spirn (1998) contributes 
notable work applying the concept of language to landscape, but has a much broader scope 
and also devotes a great deal of attention to the aesthetic as well as metaphorical side of 
landscape. The analysis of reading the river as a whitewater raft guide explicitly defines the 
scope of analysis, which also sets it apart from other works on the similar topics. It is a very 
specific and detailed break-down of visually perceived forms and corresponding actions and 
shows that human visual perception can be structurally analyzed, even in a dynamic situation 
such as orienting a river, because there are many layers to our perceptual experience. 
 The second paper was originally inspired by an insightful suggestion made by Thure 
von Uexküll, who states, “Thus, we can compare terms such as system, structure, unit, code, 
etc., which have been taken from linguistics, to the terminology of the Umwelt theory, 
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because the linguistic terms seem to illustrate the concepts of the Umwelt theory in a more 
precise manner than do the illustrations drawn from music, which Uexküll favored” (Uexküll, 
T. 1992: 286). Due to differences that have later been pointed out between animal and human 
semiosis (e.g. Deacon 1997, Maran 2012, Kull 2014), the author argues against taking this 
direction, and suggests another line of development toward the impact of learning on the 
umwelt and ecosystem as a whole. At first glance this appears to be contradictory to the first 
paper, which demonstrates the possibility of structurally analyzing perception. However, the 
first paper is species-specific to humans. Many other studies, such as in cognitive linguistics 
(Lakoff, Johnson, 1999), demonstrate relations between verbal language and human 
perception, which may play a role in the analyzability of human percpetion in structural 
terms. The second paper deals with the much more general level of animal perception, and 
therefore this level of abstraction necessitates a different metalanguage.  
 The concept of learning plays an important role in the metalanguage of the second 
paper. The semiotics of learning has been addressed implicitly by Gregory Bateson (2000 
[1972]), which is relied upon in the paper, and more recently in explicit terms by Kalevi Kull, 
who correlates different types of learning to different types of semiosis, defining learning in 
general as the establishment of new sign relations in his statement, “If a response becomes a 
habit […] it is called learning” (Kull 2014: 52). Andrew Stables (2006) also contributes a 
semiotic approach to learning for fields of human activity, such as education, with the aim of 
displacing conventional dichotomies such as mind-body. Learning is primarily studied in the 
fields of psychology and education and has been broadly categorized into two major 
paradigms of objectivism (the transmission of an abstract code) and constructivism (an active 
process of interpretation dependent on individual histories and situational conditions). This 
dichotomy is addressed in the pivotal works of Pierre Bourdieu (1990), Jean Lave and 
Etienne Wenger (1991), and George Lakoff (1987), and becomes a useful tool for 
distinguishing implicit concepts of learning in structural linguistics and Jakob von Uexküll’s 
approach. 
0.3. The research questions and methodological basis 
 The questions driving this thesis are: 1) can we analyze human direct perception of 
the natural environment with a concept of text, and how does this dialogue affect the semiotic 
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metalanguage, and 2) can we bring concepts from structural linguistics into Jakob von 
Uexküll’s perceptual model, and if not, what would be the next steps for development? Both 
of these questions concern a refinement of the semiotic metalanguage for analyzing 
functional perception of the environment - one with humans in particular, and the other 
toward animals in general. Through the process of seeking answers, both papers clearly 
define the parameters of the research object, as well as the scope of the applied theory. The 
conclusions of the thesis specify semiotic concepts from these studies that are relevant at a 
more abstract level of direct perception in general. 
 Both papers emphasize the importance of ad hoc methodology as a fundamental part 
of a semiotic approach. Peeter Torop has addressed ad hoc methodology and reflexivity as 
specific features of the Tartu-Moscow semiotic school, and more specifically in response to 
novel objects with low-analysability that demand the researcher to construct, define, and 
create the analysability (Torop 2014). The object of the first paper, reading the river from the 
point of view of a whitewater raft-guide, has been studied in terms of optimal experience 
from a phenomenological point of view in the Ph.D. thesis of LA Beck (1987), and from a 
more general phenomenological-anthropological approach connecting sensory experience to 
cultural models (Krause 2013). From a structural-semiotic standpoint, the author needed to be 
receptive to the particularities of the research object, which resulted in some modifications to 
the applied theory of text. For example, the changing water level turned out to modify the 
internal sign-relations of the environmental text, resulting in the concept of a natural meta-
sign. 
 Another important factor in an ad hoc approach is a specification of the level of 
analysis, as different levels or aspects of research objects may warrant different languages of 
description. The level of analysis plays an important role toward establishing parameters of 
theories and definitions of concepts. In the first paper, ‘reading the river’ as a text is on the 
level of a conscious and habitual practice, a level more abstract than the phenomenological, 
unconscious level, because it can be easily described linguistically, and less abstract than the 
level of general human physical constraints and cultural models. For example, it would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to apply a structural concept of text to the unconscious, 
phenomenological layer dealt with, for example, by David Abram (1996). An example of this 
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would be like trying to apply the concept of text toward the balancing act of walking a 
slackline, something that is similar to a tightrope but sinks downward a bit when weight is 
applied, resulting in movement of the line as one walks on it. Every slight movement of the 
body is responding to movements of the line and vice-versa, in a dynamic interaction that is 
impossible to learn without doing it, new every time, and largely unconscious. As one 
becomes skilled at this activity, the borders between the body and the slackline become 
blurred, and such a dynamic research object results in low analyzability. However, the 
phenomenological layer is not denied importance for whitewater rafting, as it is observable 
from an outside perspective in the difference in skill between experienced river-guides, who 
easily stay in the current without paying much attention, and novice guides who are known to 
zigzag in and out of the current in a tireless effort to stay in it. One could say that the more 
experienced the guide, the less strong are the borders between the guide and the river. This 
aspect would warrant different research methods, such as participant observation, and a more 
flexible metalanguage than the concept of text. 
 As part of the ad hoc approach for determining the applicability of a theory to a 
specific research object, the author also uses the same framework for differentiating semiotic 
theories in each paper. This framework explicates the notions of sign and code in the theory, 
the aim of the theory, the methodology used, and the locus of meaning-generation 
emphasized by the theory. It is found that in the theories originating in linguistics and literary 
theory (e.g. Saussure 2011 [1959; 1916]; Jakobson 1956, 1960, 1967; Lotman 1977, 1978), 
the notion of sign is an arbitrary unit that is only intelligible in terms of differential value in 
relation to other units within a bounded hierarchical system. The “glottocentric” nature of 
studies of culture is criticized by Susan Petrilli as European-dominated (2012), and by Paul 
Cobley, who suggests that analyses of culture are built upon a premise of human 
exceptionalism, while biosemiotics offers a more “agent-friendly” approach (Cobley 2010: 
228). Semiotic concepts of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics also become useful for 
differentiating two different approaches. In structural linguistics and Lotman’s early notion of 
text, as well as in the first paper of this thesis, more attention is paid to to the relations of 
syntactics and semantics, while in Jakob von Uexküll’s and Gibson’s approaches, more 
attention is paid to the relations between semantics and pragmatics. This results in different 
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methodologies, as the subject plays a much greater role in the perceptual models of meaning-
making and must be studied as a result (for example, Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt research). 
0.4. Abstracts of the papers and structure of the thesis 
 This section provides the abstract of each paper to introduce the papers with more 
clarity and to show the specifics of each paper. The introduction is then finalized by a 
conclusions section which synthesizes the findings of the two papers into an integral semiotic 
metalanguage tailored for the study of direct perception. The structure of the thesis could be 
viewed as concentric circles in regard to this research topic. The introduction is the largest, 
most abstract circle. The second paper, discussing primarily theories at a general level of 
perception that would include all animal species, would be the middle circle. The first paper, 
which is species-specific toward humans and activity-specific toward whitewater rafting, 
would be the smallest and most concrete circle.  
0.4.1. Abstract of “Shoshone as a text: A structural-semiotic view of reading the river as a 
whitewater raft guide” 
 This article investigates the functional ‘reading’ of a river by whitewater raft guides in 
order to understand the semiotic mechanisms involved in human direct perception of the 
environment compared to the reading of cultural texts. This research finds significance in the 
on-going search for theories and methodologies in the environmental humanities. Juri 
Lotman’s theory of text is applied in an ad hoc analysis of a section of river named Shoshone 
in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, USA in order to examine whether his theory is useful for 
interpreting and analysing human perception of the environment, and how his notion of text 
could be enhanced in this dialogue with a new research object. Lotman’s theory is found to be 
useful for describing the cognitive side of reading the river, as connections between visually 
perceived forms on the river are connected to specific bodily movements in response. 
Lotman’s theory is then brought into dialogue with the work of James J. Gibson, whose 
research on direct perception of the environment both problematises and potentially 
compliments Lotman’s theory on this material. Basic similarities between cognitive 
perception of the environment and the reading of cultural texts are suggested; namely, 
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demarcation, hierarchical structure, and the realisation of a system of signs. Important 
differences are also discovered, such as the greater variety of interpretation afforded by 
cultural texts than interaction with the river, as well as the largely unconscious bodily 
attunement to the environment involved in reading the river. Two modifications are 
conclusively made to Lotman’s theory, informed by both the object and Gibson’s theories, as 
a step toward a semiotic research model for analysing human perception of the environment, 
which is at a blurry intersection between cultural mediation and physically functional 
perception. 
0.4.2. Abstract of “Expanding Umwelt Theory: From Structural Linguistics to Cognitive 
Learning” 
  I present a response to Thure von Uexküll’s attempt to complement Jakob von 
Uexküll’s theories by incorporating concepts from structural linguistics. I more closely 
compare structural linguistics and Jakob von Uexküll’s theories, noting significant differences 
unmentioned by Thure von Uexküll, leading to the claim that Jakob von Uexküll’s theories 
need further development in relation to cognitive learning. I suggest that learning has a higher 
status and different conceptualization in a bio- or eco-semiotic approach than it does in 
structural linguistics. Bateson’s concepts of proto- and deutero-learning are found to be 
complementary to Jakob von Uexküll’s theory at the intra-specific level, while Hoffmeyer’s 
notions of semethic interaction and semiotic freedom are useful to describe interspecific 
relations and semiotic capacities of organisms.  
0.5. Preliminary conclusions and future directions of study 
 The aim of this thesis was to test and redefine semiotic models in a consistent way, 
and to develop the topic a bit further in the framing introduction via the specification of 
semiotic perceptual concepts. Both papers suggest steps toward new research models. The 
first outlines an environmental concept of text informed by a dialogue with the research 
object and with Gibson’s theory of affordances. The semiotization of the water level by the 
river guides leads to the concept of a natural meta-sign, or a sign in the environment that 
changes the context or internal syntactical relations of a meaningful environmental unit. 
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Additional modifications in response to Gibson’s theory is the differentiation of two different 
levels of pragmatic constraints, the lowest level being the actual situation and actions taken in 
the moment, and the more abstract level that includes cultural models, human physical 
capabilities, and individual histories and skill. The second paper suggests complementing 
Jakob von Uexküll’s theories with Bateson’s multi-leveled approach to learning, with proto-
learning being the level of habitual sign processing, and deutero-learning at the level of 
establishing correspondences with greater contexts, or learning new patterns of proto-
learning. Using these findings as well as additional literature on the topic, some semiotic 
concepts related to direct perception of the natural environment are outlined. 
1. In semiotic perceptual models of the environment, the subject is inherently part of the 
structure of the sign in its active distinction between self and other. Signs are therefore 
acted. This is discussed more explicitly in the second paper, in the breakdown of the notion 
of sign. In the case of reading the river, the meaning of the forms perceived on the river are 
the actions taken by the river-guides. Only those particular features on the river that play a 
role in the action and orientation of the guides become signs (including features on the 
river that are given proper names), while other features are not recognized. 
2. The concept of code is viewed as a continuum from closed to open codes (open codes first 
suggested by Maran, 2012). Linguistic and symbolic codes are at the closed end of the 
spectrum, having the capacity for decontextualization, while ecological codes are at the 
open end of the spectrum. The river as text is closed to the extent that it involves only one 
species, can be described linguistically, and is fixed as a cognitive plan in the mind of the 
guide on the river, but also more open than linguistic texts, as it is subject to environmental 
changes, such as the water-level. A fully open code includes multiple species and means no 
participant has access to the full code, each participant contributes to the construction of 
the code via acted signs, and the code is contested and in constant flux. This overlaps with 
Gibson’s concept of perception as continuous, with past and present indiscrete, as well as 
Ingold’s concept of environment (and therefore, organism) as never complete, or in other 
words, a process that is “continually under construction” (2000: 20). 
3. Learning is situated and hierarchical. It is understood as the creation of correspondences in 
a spatio-temporal context. At the level of proto-learning, this is the creation of 
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correspondence between a sign and its meaning. At the level of deutero-learning, this is the 
creation of correspondences between a sign and its context. In the case of the river, this 
concept of learning would be on the situational and perhaps phenomenological level of 
reading the river, which is outside of the scope of the paper, while the transmission of the 
text of Shoshone via verbal description and maps would be a different and more human-
specific notion of learning. 
4. Natural meta-signs are signs perceived in the environment that are about other 
environmental signs, altering their meaning for the perceiver. To conceptualize meta-signs 
as discrete seems much easier from a human perspective, given the capacity to codify 
environmental phenomena linguistically (such as in the case of the water level for river 
guides). Meta-signs for animals should be considered much more distributed and holistic, 
such as the qualitative changing of seasons, differences in time of day, or internal 
physiological state. Gregory Bateson conceives body language and other “paralinguistic” 
signs among mammals as meta-communicative, which, for example, changes the meaning 
of words for humans (2000[1972]: 371). These could also be considered non-discrete 
meta-signs. Recognition of new contexts is not always via the processing of meta-signs. 
For example, it also occurs through organisms’ ontogenetic development, an aspect well 
articulated by Jakob von Uexküll. 
 This list is intended to be a step toward the construction of a metalanguage in 
response to the dynamic research object of direct perception. A future research problem for 
development is the analyzability of the process of learning. How could this be studied and 
better understood from a semiotic perspective? This could be done via participant observation 
methodology in the same research object of reading the river, by observing new river-guides 
and learning to river-guide oneself. In addition to the hierarchical levels brought out in this 
thesis, different stages could also be established, and different sign types relied upon in 
learning could be brought out. For example, in her study of inter-specific communication, 
Riin Magnus (2014) points out that one semiotic principle in the formation of signs between 
guide dogs and their handlers is that referential communication shifts from symbolic to 
symptomatic signs, or in other words, from segmented verbal signs to subtle bodily 
movements that are less visible to the outside observer. Considering the common knowledge 
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among river guides that the more experienced guides effortlessly remain in the current while 
the newer guides tend to zig-zag across it, this shift from symbolic to symptomatic signs may 
also be relevant in the process of learning to read the river. 
 Another line of development for this thesis could be to explicate further ecological 
sign types. Could there be a further analysis that goes deeper than the abstract notion of meta-
signs, and how might these be described? Maran’s idea of archetypical structures already 
gives examples of this, such as loud, low sounds or quick movements inspiring an archetype 
of fear (2012). This very abstract layer of signs in the animal world brings forth a closer look 
at semiotic connections across various species. 
 Functional-perceptual semiotic concepts could also be extended toward human 
reception of cultural texts in order reveal similarities and differences between the two. Tim 
Ingold’s essay on “mind-walking” explores this topic further and suggests that “[…] the 
terrains of the imagination and the physical environment, far from existing on distinct 
ontological levels, run into one another to the extent of being barely distinguishable” (2010: 
15). Cobley also contributes a paper demonstrating the relevance of biosemiotic concepts to 
cultural and linguistic phenomena (2010).  
 Finally, a somewhat different direction could be taken in terms of specifically human 
perception of the environment. Whitewater rafting serves as a fruitful research object to 
understanding the many different sign systems applied to a concrete environmental text. It 
could be widened to include further human sign-systems. For example, it could include the 
layer of economic sign systems as articulated by Hornborg (2001), as there are at least six 
known commercial companies running the section of Shoshone studied by this thesis, and 
Shoshone is used as a unit to measure the cost and structure the type of trips. In addition to 
studying the relations between the economic sign system and the vitality of the ecosystem it 
impacts, relations between the functional sign system and the economic sign system could be 
explicated (for example, it is better for business to hit big waves or to see specific features 
from specific positions on the river). Symbolic stories could also be included and related to 
other sign systems and underlying cultural models. The different forms of memory that these 
various sign systems are stored in could also be taken into account, and different types of 
texts could be brought out and compared (functional texts, historic narratives, etc).  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SHOSHONE AS A TEXT: A STRUCTURAL-SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS OF READING THE 
RIVER AS A WHITEWATER RAFT GUIDE 
Jamie Kruis 
Accepted upon minor revisions to Approaches to Culture Theory, vol. 6, CECT proceedings  
Abstract. This article investigates the functional ‘reading’ of a river by whitewater raft 
guides in order to understand the semiotic mechanisms involved in human direct perception 
of the environment compared to the reading of cultural texts. This research finds significance 
in the on-going search for theories and methodologies in the environmental humanities. Juri 
Lotman’s theory of text is applied in an ad hoc analysis of a section of river named Shoshone 
in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, USA in order to examine whether his theory is useful for 
interpreting and analysing human perception of the environment, and how his notion of text 
could be enhanced in this dialogue with a new research object. Lotman’s theory is found to be 
useful for describing the cognitive side of reading the river, as connections between visually 
perceived forms on the river are connected to specific bodily movements in response. 
Lotman’s theory is then brought into dialogue with the work of James J. Gibson, whose 
research on direct perception of the environment both problematises and potentially 
compliments Lotman’s theory on this material. Basic similarities between cognitive 
perception of the environment and the reading of cultural texts are suggested; namely, 
demarcation, hierarchical structure, and the realisation of a system of signs. Important 
differences are also discovered, such as the greater variety of interpretation afforded by 
cultural texts than interaction with the river, as well as the largely unconscious bodily 
attunement to the environment involved in reading the river. Two modifications are 
conclusively made to Lotman’s theory, informed by both the object and Gibson’s theories, as 
a step toward a semiotic research model for analysing human perception of the environment, 
which is at a blurry intersection between cultural mediation and physically functional 
perception.  
Introduction: epistemology of Tartu semiotics 
 Various notions of text have been applied to landscape in human geography. One 
common approach, textual analysis, is connected with discourse analysis, and “describes the 
attempt to understand the content, mode of address and authority, organization, and other 
aspects of language-in-use” (Dittmer 2010, 280). This approach centres on power relations 
and natural language-based concepts of text. Other applications of text include structural and 
post-structural approaches, the latter emphasising the interpretation side of the text and 
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thereby aiming to uncover the multi-vocal nature of landscape representation (Duncan & 
Duncan 2010). Structural semiotic approaches, most often using theories derived from 
Ferdinand de Saussure, are criticised for the researcher’s alleged assumption that s/he is an 
“expert decoder” of the landscape (op cit, 226). Underlying these approaches and criticism is 
the idea that landscape as a text is notably separate from reality. Text in this sense is an 
arbitrary representation of landscape and something to be contested. 
 This paper takes a different approach to textualisation of landscape in an application 
of Juri Lotman’s notion of text to direct perception of a particular section of the Colorado 
river, about 3.4 kilometres, called Shoshone in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, USA. A few 
words about epistemology are important in order to understand what is different about this 
approach, and why it is useful. The ad hoc, object-based epistemology often employed by 
Tartu semiotics reflects the assertion that different research objects, levels, or aspects of 
research objects may necessitate different languages of description, as well as modify the 
theory in the process of analysis. This relates to the importance of distinguishing the 
metalanguage from the object language, expressed in the notable statement: “[...] we should 
distinguish between the conception of culture from its own point of view ‒ and from the point 
of view of a scientific metasystem which describes it” (Uspenskij et al 1973, 1). This is a 
particular form of reflexivity based on the premise of modelling theory. The way that the 
researcher describes the object undoubtedly transforms it by selecting certain aspects and 
drawing particular organisational relations between them ‒ a process guided by the 
organisation of the theories used and broader academic and paradigmatic discourse. Lotman 
states that this is the case for all theoretical knowledge, as “any logical model is known to be 
poorer [i.e. more abstract] than its object and can be an instrument of knowledge only under 
this condition” (1975, 199). However, in models like the one used in this analysis, extra-
systemic empirical features found to contradict the researcher’s system of explanation do not 
intrinsically render the explanation insufficient, but are a necessary part of these two different 
levels of reality. As Lotman states, deformation “is a means and a condition of 
knowledge” (op cit, 203). It is rather more important to ascertain the appropriateness of the 
model chosen for the research object, opening up a dialogue between the two. Instead of 
necessitating a more specific critical approach to power relations, a step often taken in human 
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geography, this transformative phenomenon based on different codes, contexts, and 
interpreters ‒ or in one phrase, the “theory of models” ‒ is considered to be one fundamental 
aspect of meaning generation (op cit, 200). Additionally, the separation of text from reality is 
not something to be marked as a peculiar phenomenon, as reality for all observers is always 
partial, constructed, and transformed through modelling systems. Therefore semioticians do 
not necessarily consider their research as expert decoding, but rather as a useful, constructive 
point of view. 
1.1. Theory, object, and discovery 
1.1.1. Theory and object 
 Shoshone as a text is specific to the point of view of a river guide within the activity 
of whitewater rafting, explicating a functional connection between visually perceived forms 
and corresponding bodily actions. The material for this analysis includes visual, written, and 
verbal representations associated with river guiding, as well as previous participation by the 
author in a river orientation course and professional guiding on Shoshone and other rivers. 
This study finds significance in several contexts. First, it is part of a larger on-going search 
for suitable methodologies and research concepts in the environmental humanities (for 
example, ecocriticism, new materialism, human geography, and landscape studies) for 
interpreting and analysing human interaction with the physical environment. Second, this 
contributes to an understanding of the semiotisation of the physical environment in the 
context of the Tartu semiotic tradition by critically examining the use of literary concepts for 
environmental perception. Finally, this study contributes a possible approach for the emerging 
field of ecosemiotics, understood generally here as the semiotic analysis of the relations 
between nature and culture. Therefore, this study expands Lotman’s theory of text while also 
contributing to transdisciplinary research developments exploring relations between nature 
and culture. 
 The Conceptual Dictionary of the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School has abstracted eight 
different definitions of text from Lotman’s work (Levchenko & Salupere 1999). For the 
purpose of this analysis, being rather far from traditional applications of text, just three basic 
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features are taken from The Structure of the Artistic Text: the text realises a system of signs, it 
is demarcated as a unit, and it has an internal, hierarchical structure (Lotman 1977). These 
basic features are chosen because direct perception of the river is not near as arbitrary as an 
artistic text, the latter of which is much more complex in combining multiple sign systems on 
the same level. An artistic text necessitates greater attention to extrasystemic features, having 
their own autonomous orders which often contradict each other, enabling the generation and 
storage of large amounts of information through this heterogeneity of sign systems. Only one 
sign system is described in this textualisation of the river, which cannot be localised at the 
cultural level, but is in between direct perception and culture. This more situated, functional 
knowledge is less open to interpretation than an artistic text. It is influenced by culture as a 
socially mediated activity pursued for a myriad of reasons, and as the body of knowledge 
associated with how to physically function on the river, what kind of technology is required, 
and the specific terminology associated with the activity and locality of Shoshone.  
In practice, culture is responsible for providing the opportunity to develop this specific 
functional perception. Once actually rafting on the river, human physical capacities for 
perception and action come into play and attune to the river over time through practice, 
alongside the verbal and visual descriptions of how to be a good river guide, and explanations 
for things that go wrong. While the textual nature of a functional perception of the river could 
be said to be simpler than an artistic text, the experience as a whole is a rich one, ranging 
from phenomenological affect to the symbolic narratives attached to significant features in 
Shoshone, and to Shoshone as a whole. These aspects of whitewater rafting exceed the limits 
of this paper, though they deserve further study. 
 The basic concept of text used in this analysis also complements James J. Gibson’s 
approach to direct perception of the environment, who sought terminology to describe how 
optical information pick-up, enabled by locomotion within an entire perceptual system, 
consists of a concurrent recognition of variant and invariant structures in the environment 
(1986). While Lotman is relied on much more heavily for this analysis, Gibson provides a 
relevant theoretical point of comparison in order to not only observe what Lotman’s theory 
contributes, but also to understand how it is changed and problematised on this material.  
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 Applying Lotman’s notion of text to perception of the natural environment is 
unexplored territory both in human geography and in traditional Tartu-Moscow semiotics.  1
The closest application by Lotman himself was his analysis of St. Petersburg, which suggests 
potential, but he primarily focuses on the level of the city as a whole, including historical 
development, mythologies, and symbolism embodied in the architecture and geography 
(Lotman 1990). The meaning described in this paper is functional meaning framed by a 
specific activity. Lotman’s work has, however, served as an impetus for debates about the 
primacy of perception as a modelling system (for example Sebeok & Danesi 2000). Thomas 
A. Sebeok, who established  the field of zoosemiotics and later catalysed the development of 
biosemiotics, has contended that a zoosemiotic modelling system must be the primary one, 
while language is a secondary modelling system and culture a tertiary one (for example 
Sebeok 1994). John Deely, a close associate of Sebeok, also contributes a great deal to the 
discussion on the semiotic threshold, and has thoroughly integrated these perspectives in his 
extensive work, The Basics of Semiotics (1990). 
 ‘Reading the river’ is common phrasing used by river guides and river orientation 
instructors. There are many different ways of physically reading the river that occur 
simultaneously. One not only sees the current in contrast with slower moving water, but feels 
it in the way that the boat moves. Guides constantly adjust their actions in response to 
situated, multi-sensory information, a process referred to by Gibson with a variety of terms, 
such as “attuned”, “sensitized”, and “education of attention” (1986, 254). Tim Ingold calls 
this process “sensitisation”, defined as the “‘fine-tuning’ of the perceptual system to new 
kinds of information” (2000, 166). Ingold’s term ‘sensitisation’ will be used from here on to 
refer to Gibson’s concept. Such a process itself may warrant a different metalanguage or level 
of description, though the process as a whole could be positioned in a potential model that 
combines Lotman and Gibson on this material, which is discussed in part three. 
 The notion of text borrowed from Lotman appears to be most useful for describing the 
cognitive side of reading the river, with a focus on a habitual connection between visual 
recognition and bodily actions. Cognitive approaches and visual perception in landscape 
 In an interview with Kalevi Kull in 1992, Lotman states that it would “undoubtedly” be legitimate to 1
apply his theories to biology and that, “[...] what does not exist in the simple will never exist in the 
complex” (Lotman & Kull 1992). This conversation is available in Russian.
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studies and human geography have been reacted against for their historical roots in a nature-
culture dichotomy, giving rise to “phenomenological, non-representational, actor-network and 
performative theories [...] which emphasize materiality and embodiment, prediscursive 
knowing and fluidity [...]” (Duncan & Duncan 2010, 239). However, cognitive and visual 
aspects cannot be denied importance, especially in this activity. Their functional significance 
for river guides is reflected in one of their key maxims, ‘set up early’. Because the river is 
constantly moving, this means consciously reacting in preparation to what is spotted up ahead 
on the river in terms of bodily movements to position the boat, modify speed, and 
communicate with the crew the plans for action. 
1.1.2. Research questions and discoveries 
Two main research questions drive this analysis, one ontological, and the other theoretical. 
The first question is, what are the similarities and differences between human perception of 
the environment and reading a cultural text? This question is a very relevant one for semiotics 
as a study of general meaning-making, and finds special significance in the context of Tartu 
semiotics today, which includes the rich history of cultural semiotics alongside the growing 
fields of biosemiotics and ecosemiotics. The second more theoretical question is, can 
Lotman’s theory of text, having originated in literary theory, provide a useful model for 
interpreting human perception of the environment? This opens up the opportunity for 
potential changes to be made to his theory in the process of this dialogue with a new research 
object, which could expand and enhance his theory of text. 
 The answers to these questions are pursued in two ways. The first approach, covered 
in part two, is object-focused in an analysis of Shoshone as a text. Reading the river as a river 
guide is a hybrid activity that blurs the boundaries between cultural mediation and direct 
perception of the environment, paving the way toward combining them into a new model. 
This analysis reveals something important in the research object which could further refine 
Lotman’s theory of text in relation to a possible type of research object under the umbrella 
term ‘human perception of the environment’. The fluctuating water level of the river, which is 
within the text, functions as a meta-sign that changes the internal sign relations of this text in 
a systematic way.  
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Meta-sign is a term adapted from Gregory Bateson to describe paradoxical signs that 
are both within the frame and acting as the frame (Bateson 2000 [1972]). Lotman refers to 
similar features in traditional texts in relation to their cultural contexts, when he states: “[...] a 
text may contain within it both textual and metatextual elements as particular substructures 
[...]. In this case the communicative currents move vertically” (Lotman 1988, 56). In the case 
of the natural environment, such a meta-sign is based on repetition of a significant change in 
the environment, which has been dealt with in landscape studies in terms of rhythms or 
seasonality. The formal marking point for such a sign is only partly arbitrary, as the habits of 
action are based on affordances offered by the river, the technology of the raft, and the 
physical capabilities of human beings, in addition to the cultural level of whitewater water 
rafting. Meta-signs may be one way of recognising seasonal changes or rhythms in the 
environment that systematically reorganise the internal sign relations of perceived 
environmental structures. Other changes may occur as a gradual change of content that 
eventually crystallise into a new internal structure, which parallels landscape researcher 
Kenneth Olwig’s notion of qualitative seasons, or “this qualitative bounding of quantitatively 
unbounded phenomena” (2005, 261). Systematic variance, whether indicated by signs within 
the text or coming about from a gradual change of its internal sign relations, as opposed to the 
variance generated by diversity in interpretation, is an additional theoretical component 
required for analysing perception of the natural environment as a text. 
 The second perspective taken in this paper, discussed in part three, is at the level of 
theory in a discussion of the possible interaction between Lotman and Gibson on this 
material. Lotman provides a more precise semiotic metalanguage for analysing the 
semiotisation of the river, while Gibson provides a more general theoretical basis for linking 
together perception and action in terms of pragmatics and physical constraints. Important 
differences are also explicated between these two theories. Most notable is the different role 
of the subject in Lotman’s notion of text and Gibson’s approach to perception of the 
environment, which relates to different methodologies and explanations of meaning-
generation. Charles Morris’s general theory of signs is used as a reference point for 
comparison and an additional resource for terminology in the move toward combining 
Lotman and Gibson into a new model. Lotman’s theory of text, enriched by both the object 
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and Gibson’s theories, is found to be a useful contribution toward the analysis of this research 
object, uncovering similarities and differences between meaning generated through cultural 
texts and meaning generated through perception of the environment. 
1.2. Analysis of Shoshone as a text 
1.2.1. Demarcation 
 As mentioned before, three basic features of the text are used to describe Shoshone. 
First, the text must be demarcated as a unit. This unit can carry different functions for 
different social communities (Lotman & Piatigorsky 1978). Shoshone is collectively 
demarcated by a variety of users, including commercial rafting companies, the forest service, 
and private adventurers, by the ‘put-in’ or boat ramp (located on the highway exit called 
Shoshone) and the Grizzly Creek ‘take- out’ (located on the highway exit called Grizzly 
Creek), or the next boat ramp down-river of the put-in. This level of the whole functions 
economically for rafting companies as it marks one possible ‘trip’ tourists can purchase. It 
also marks a section to be patrolled by the forest service, a federal institution responsible for 
ensuring, among other things, that commercial companies are following safety laws 
associated with using the river. This unit also functions for various individuals in over a 
dozen YouTube videos, who record their adventurous experiences with water-proof video 
cameras on the river trips. Such videos include “Shoshone” in the title or description and 
begin and end the video with the put-in and take-out boat ramps.  
Of most interest for this analysis is the functional meaning of the whole for river 
guides, which is expressed by the International Scale of River Difficulty (Whitewater). This 
system rates particular rapids as well as whole sections of rivers like Shoshone on a scale of 
one to six, six being too dangerous for commercial usage. These ratings are based on the 
general morphological structure of the river and the strength of flow of the river. Shoshone is 
divided in a partly arbitrary way into ‘high’ and ‘low’ water according to seasonal changes in 
the water level, and is rated a class four at high water and a class three at low water. What is 
most significant about this classification system in relation to Shoshone as a text is that from 
class three and up, previous visual inspection of the river is required before one can actually 
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travel the river. This means walking alongside the river and noting significant features and 
possible routes that can be taken, as ad hoc reading would be too dangerous. Therefore, a 
functional textualisation of the river, or in other words, a memorisation of significant features 
(often facilitated by giving them proper names, as will be seen in the next section) and 
habitual actions associated with them to form a specific route through a bounded section, is 
probably more common from class three rapids and up, when visual inspection and a specific 
cognitive map is necessary. 
1.2.2. Sign system and hierarchical structure 
 The second basic feature of the text is that it must realise a system of signs. Lotman 
states that, in this sense, the text is the material realisation of an abstract system, analogous to 
Saussure’s speech and language (Lotman 1977). The abstract system realised by Shoshone 
consists of visually recognised and termed features of the river with corresponding habitual 
actions shared (at least) by the local rafting companies and a river orientation course at the 
local community college, Colorado Mountain College. The author calls this system the river-
bound sign system. The structure of the river-bound sign system can be understood in 
comparison to natural language. Since Lotman references Saussure’s language and speech, 
the structure of natural language can be understood in Saussure’s terms; that is, a system of 
phonetic and conceptual differences (respectively: cat/hat; father/mother) (Saussure 2011 
[1959]). The river is a fitting analogy to Saussure’s idea of amorphous thought and sound, 
and its features are also intelligible in terms of differential value. Relevant contrasts 
distinguish larger features, exhibiting a hierarchical structure of perception.  
Hierarchical structure in terms of perception of the natural environment has been 
described by both Gibson and landscape architect Anne Spirn with a term called “nesting”, 
and Spirn explicitly relates this to language (Gibson 1986, 9; Spirn 1998, 16). Nesting 
describes how features of the environment appear as forms within forms, each level having a 
different order, such as a leaf within a tree within a forest. The river is a bit different in that 
there is a relative independence of form from a constantly flowing substance, probably 
creating a different phenomenological affect. However, forms on the river still exhibit a 
hierarchical structure that is important for functional meaning. At the most minimal level are 
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those differences that function to recognise features ‒ differences in the speed of the water, 
the direction of flow, and the texture, shape, and colour of its surface. At the next level are 
those termed features such as the current, eddies, rocks, and waves. They are more complex 
in that they consist of multiple differences working together. A significant difference from 
Saussure’s concept of language, however, is that such differential value on the river is not 
entirely arbitrary, but is based on perceptual capabilities of humans, affordances offered by 
the river, and the material technology associated with the specific activity of whitewater 
rafting. 
 There are many examples of differential value in the river-bound sign system. One 
very important feature is the current, or the fastest moving part of the river, where it is 
generally best to keep the boat, as it helps build speed for waves. The current is only 
intelligible in contrast with slower moving water. Another feature is an eddy, or calm water 
that slowly moves in a circular direction against the main current (Figure 1). Eddies are 
created by an upstream obstacle, such as a jutting shore or a large rock. They are 
distinguished by a line separating them from the rest of the water flowing downstream, as 
well as a glassier surface and a detectable difference in the direction of flow. Eddies function 
as places to stop the boat, often necessary to comply with the safety law enforced by the 
forest service to maintain visual and auditory connections with other rafts that are part of the 
same company and trip. The habitual actions for entering an eddy are to position the boat at a 
forty-five degree angle to the eddy with the back of the boat pointing toward it, come as close 
to the upstream obstacle as possible without hitting it, and enter backward with as much 
speed as possible. 
 Another example is a sleeper, or a dangerous rock just under the surface of the water 
(Figure 2). They are barely detectable by a slightly slower moving spot on the water with a 
subtle glassy appearance. Sleepers are obstacles always to be avoided by the raft. In addition 
to recognising waves in general, which are distinguished by differences in speed, shape, 
colour, and direction of water flow, one must recognise waves that are safe to hit, and waves 
that are not. Safe waves must have a higher amplitude than the water level directly upstream, 
and are therefore determined by a difference in height. The rule for action associated with 
hitting waves is to hit them straight on, with enough speed, the latter depending on the height 
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of the wave. Therefore, after spotting an oncoming wave, the guide will begin rowing and 
command the crew to paddle. As soon as the guide sees the front end of the boat reach the 
base of the wave, this is a sign to dig both oars in the water and push through the wave with 
as much strength as possible. 
 The final feature that will be mentioned here is that of the rapid, or a series of waves. 
The entrance of a rapid usually forms a downstream ‘V’ (Figure 3). In general, it is best to 
enter down the centre of this ‘V’. It is easily detectable by the difference in colour, shape, and 
movement. While general terms such as current, eddy, and wave are used to distinguish 
features of the water, another practice associated with textualising the river is applying proper 
names to certain rocks, rock complexes, eddies, waves, rapids, and entire sequences of rapids, 
like Shoshone. This is shown in a map used by the company, Whitewater Rafting, LLC., 
where the author worked as a river guide (Figure 4). 
 As can be seen, reading the river as a river guide means recognising relevant features 
and moving through the river accordingly. This is more of a kinetic experience than reading a 
novel, appreciating a work of art, watching a film, or listening to a symphony. Gibson’s 
ecological affordance theory stresses the reciprocal relationship between locomotion and 
visual perception, because affordances, or action possibilities offered by the environment, 
need to be physically explored and discovered by the organism (Gibson 1986). He states: 
“[...] we must perceive in order to move, but must also move in order to perceive” (op cit, 
223). This marks a key difference from traditional applications of Lotman’s text, uniting 
perception, cognition, and physical movement in semiosis. 
1.2.3. The river textuality 
 Lotman describes the text as the material embodiment of the system (1977). He states: 
“We should stress that in speaking of the material expression of a text, we have in mind one 
highly specific property of sign systems. It is not ‘things’ themselves, but the relations of 
things, which are the material substance of sign systems” (1977, 53). Shoshone as a text is 
materialised in its particular relation of features to each other in time and space in order to 
enable corresponding habitual actions, which in their totality form a specific route taken by 
river guides. Using Korzybski’s famous distinction between the map and the territory, 
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Gregory Bateson states that what gets onto the map are differences that make a difference 
(2000 [1972]). In its materialisation as a text, Shoshone has become a set of differences that 
make a difference. In addition to countless rocks, waves, and eddies that go unnoticed from 
the perspective of the river guide, there are infinite other differences that could be made when 
viewing Shoshone from other perspectives, such as a geologist, or a tourist. 
 The distinguished features such as rapids, rocks, and eddies, most of which are given 
proper names in Shoshone, never function in isolation but always in relation to each other in 
space and time. The minimal un-termed differences in the appearance of water relate to each 
other spatially, in their functioning to distinguish the greater forms, and can be found at any 
spot on the river. The author’s use of the term ‘spatially’ is in an ideal sense, meaning the 
horizontal dimension of the river, as if viewed from the side as a fixed slice. This is opposed 
to sequentially, or the vertical or temporal dimension of the river described by terms such as 
‘up- and down-river’. The greater forms such as the current, eddies, rocks, and waves relate 
to each other both spatially and sequentially, simultaneously used to indicate local and 
immediate actions of orientation and those in preparation to ‘set up early’ for upcoming 
features. The named rapids from Baptism to Maneater (Figure 4) are comprised of multiple 
waves, and while they function in the same way as the other more generally termed features 
in terms of spatial and sequential orientation, they relate to each other only in terms of a 
sequence, as they are all included in the route.  
An example will help demonstrate some particular sign relations of this text. The rapid, 
Tuttle’s Tumble, lies sequentially in between a large sleeper and a dangerous rock complex 
named Marty’s Diner. The sleeper indicates the entrance of Tuttle’s Tumble, and the guide 
angles and positions the boat relative to this rock and the first wave. The guide also builds 
speed upon recognition of a certain distance from the sleeper. Upon entering Tuttle’s Tumble, 
the guide keeps in mind that Marty’s Diner is just down-river on the left, and after digging the 
oars in the water to push straight through the first two waves, s/he turns the boat 180 degrees 
in order to back away from it (which entails pulling on the two oars), which is the strongest, 
quickest manoeuver. Passing Marty’s Diner is a sign for the guide to turn the boat back 
around again 180 degrees, in order to back across the river to avoid the next rock. This next 
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rock is a sign to set up early, in terms of position and speed, for the next rapid called The 
Wall. This brief example is meant to demonstrate the internal sign relations of this text. 
 Lotman also states that being a realisation of the abstract system, the text always 
contains non-systemic as well as systemic elements (1977). Because of its level of difficulty 
and intense morphological relations, certain parts of Shoshone have their own rules. For 
example, the normal code for action when approaching a wave is to hit it straight on, yet 
many areas in Shoshone force one to hit waves sideways in order to start crossing the river as 
fast as possible to avoid upcoming dangers. Shoshone contains so many extra-systemic 
elements that it requires its own intensive training, even after the guide has learned how to 
read the river in general. This includes walking the river and using visual diagrams to teach 
the guides the relevant features and corresponding actions they should take on Shoshone, 
before practicing on the actual river. 
1.2.4. The water level as a meta-sign 
 One interesting feature revealed by this new application of Lotman’s theory of text is 
what the author terms a meta-sign, which is adapted from Gregory Bateson’s idea of 
metacommunicative signals, which paradoxically occur within contexts while functioning as 
frames for those contexts (Bateson 2000 [1972]). Shoshone is formally divided by river 
guides into high and low water, each of which have different respective routes and different 
training requirements. High water consists of 4000 to 6000 cubic feet per second (cfs), 6000 
being the highest level that commercial companies are allowed to do on Shoshone. At the 
marking point of 4000 cfs, the internal sign relations within Shoshone change. The significant 
rocks and rapids all remain in the same place physically and have the same names, but their 
functional relations to each other change.  
This can best be demonstrated with a brief example. Upon approaching the first rapid 
Baptism, the guide builds as much speed as possible and hits the first wave straight on. By the 
third and last wave of Baptism, there are two different action courses the guide should take 
depending on a formal distinction made between high and low water. In low water (Figure 5), 
the third and last wave of Baptism is a sign to turn the bow of the boat slightly to the left in 
preparation for an upcoming rock named Eddy Out Rock. The guide merges into the left hand 
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side of the river, and upon reaching a certain distance from Eddy Out Rock, turns the boat 
sideways and positions it so that the back end of the boat comes as close as possible to this 
rock in order to back into the eddy directly below it. This eddy is especially difficult to catch, 
so backing into it (the strongest manoeuver) is a must. Once the boat is stopped in this eddy, 
the guide verbally prepares the crew for the upcoming rapid, Tuttle’s Tumble, which is back 
on the right side of the river. Low water enables this crisscrossing from left to right without 
getting caught up on the rocks down-river of Eddy Out Rock. In high water (Figure 6), the 
third wave of Baptism has a different meaning: to turn the boat to the right, to stay on the 
right hand side of the river, and enter Tuttle’s Tumble straight on. Because the water is so 
much stronger and faster at this level, it is impossible to cross the river from Eddy Out Rock 
to Tuttle’s Tumble without getting caught up on the rocks downstream. The higher water level 
also washes out the rocks on the right hand side of the river that need to be avoided in low 
water. This shows that at the marking point of 4000 cfs, the water level (formally speaking, 
but not necessarily in practice, as the specific marking point itself is not perceptible) changes 
the internal organisation of the text. In high water, Eddy Out Rock is not even part of the 
structure, as the water moves too fast to catch the eddy safely. Therefore, the water level acts 
as a meta-sign that is both within the text, and about the text as a whole. 
 This shows how the guides have systematised this dynamic, showing one way in 
which they cope with a fluctuating environment. Lotman describes a text’s invariance by its 
particular relations of signs, which are organised hierarchically, the levels of which are held 
together with structural relations. He states: “It is these stable bonds (within each level and 
between levels) which give the text the quality of an invariant” (Lotman 1977, 53). He then 
describes that the text is broken up into variants as it functions in its social environment, i.e. 
as it is read by different readers. Since the water level relates to the text as a whole, acting as 
a sort of self-referential sign that changes how the entire text is read, it is not a variant that 
occurs due to an individual reader’s particular background. Therefore, the natural meta-sign is 
something new to add to Lotman’s theory of text, or a semiotic approach in general, in 
relation to perception of the environment. 
1.3. A dialogue between Lotman and Gibson on reading the river 
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 This section explores possible complementarity between the theories of Lotman and 
Gibson, as well as their important differences. Reading the river as a river guide is at a blurry 
intersection of a culturally mediated activity and physical interaction with the environment. 
Neither Lotman’s theory of text nor Gibson’s theory of direct perception of the environment 
are appropriate for this analysis on their own terms. Lotman’s notion of text does not yet have 
the theoretical tools available for dealing with the on-going, pragmatic nature of a mutually 
constitutive subject-in-environment. Shoshone as a text deviates from Lotman’s traditional 
applications in that it is tied to physical human capabilities and natural environmental 
affordances, thus is much less open to interpretation than an artistic text. One might try to 
navigate the rapids however they wish, but would quickly get corrected by the river. This 
object cannot be described in terms of Gibson’s theory alone either, as rooting sign processes 
between human physical capacity and environmental structures alone would omit the vast 
influence of cultural mediation, such as socially transmitted knowledge, linguistic 
constrictions, and technologies of the raft. The fact that different technologies such as kayaks 
can have different routes points to the more arbitrary influence of culture on this material.  
Gibson’s theory of direct perception of the environment stresses the physical capacities of the 
organism and the environment, as well as constant learning and situational knowledge, 
emphasising both immediate needs and historical experiences of the organism. He redefines 
perception in his academic context as a “skill that can be educated” (Gibson 1986, 246). This 
fluid concept of perception is connected to his lack of attention to the immanent structure of 
particular environmental objects and their delimitation, as his notion of invariant structure or 
nesting is more general. Lotman’s notions of demarcation, internal sign relations, and 
realisation of a system of signs provides what Gibson’s theory lacks in terms of describing the 
particular internal sign relations immanent to a bounded, meaningful cultural unit. This 
necessitates a closer look at these theories in order to see if it is possible to combine them in a 
model for environmental objects influenced by both nature and culture. 
 Key differences between these two theories of meaning-generation are interrelated 
and include a different role of the subject, a different notion and status of learning, and a 
different locus of meaning-generation. The different role of the subject is reflected in both the 
methodology and metalanguages of the two fields. The different terms used in the work of 
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Lotman and Gibson, such as (respectively) ‘reader’ or ‘receiver’ as opposed to ‘subject’ or 
‘perceiver’, connotatively indicate the different ontological status this aspect holds toward 
meaning-generation, as the former terms are more passive, and the latter more active. In 
Lotman’s more structuralist writings, meaning is considered immanent to the text. His 
methodology does not take the particular interpreter of the text into account as much as the 
character of the text as such, and its embeddedness in other cultural texts. In order to 
understand a text, the reader must know (whether consciously or unconsciously) the codes 
which it realises. Thus, learning is implicitly delimited to learning the codes with which to 
understand the text. Meaning for Lotman is something either transmitted or generated by the 
text, which is analogous to an “autonomous individual” or “autonomous 
personality” (Lotman 1988, 56–57). Meanings of signs are therefore always bound to their 
relations with other signs and the interaction between larger sign systems, which is 
theoretically outside of the subject. 
 For Gibson, perception of the environment occurs in a complementary relation 
between the physical properties and activities of the subject and information available in the 
environment, independent of the subject. Gibson explains this apparent contradiction with his 
concept of sensitisation, or a constant attunement to the physical world in which new 
meanings can always be discovered by the subject. Information in the environment, for 
Gibson, is not transmittable but “inexhaustible”, because perception is a constant process 
(Gibson 1986, 243). Thus, learning for Gibson is also constant (though it could be argued to 
occur in different degrees of intensity) and nearly synonymous to perception. Gibson’s notion 
of learning has a much higher status and different conceptualisation than it does in Lotman’s 
theory of the text, which implies a more traditional perspective of learning as the transmission 
of an abstract code.  Gibson’s concept of learning is relational and situated, based on variant 2
conditions rather than invariant content. While the same case could be argued for the 
interpretation process of a cultural text, it simply is not the focus of Lotman’s attention in his 
analyses. The primary meaningful distinction for Gibson is the distinction between self and 
 Pierre Bourdieu discusses this traditional concept of learning, termed “objectivism”, as inherent to the 2
Saussurean paradigm of thought (1980, 26). In a foreword to Jean Lave’s and Etienne Wenger’s Situated 
Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation, William F. Hanks also mentions this notion of learning in 
relation to “classical structural analysis” (Hanks 1991, 16).
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environment, which parallels Jakob von Uexküll’s elementary sign, or “ego-
quality” (Uexküll, T. 1992, 288). The subject therefore plays a much greater role as 
physically part of the structure of meaning, which is relational in both space and time, and 
complementary to the environment. The invariant structures, or meaning, perceived by the 
subject are situationally and developmentally relative, dependent on the organism’s physical 
properties, historical background, and pragmatic circumstance. 
 This all points to a different locus of meaning-generation in Lotman’s and Gibson’s 
respective theories. Charles Morris’ general theory of signs is useful as a reference point for 
comparison, whose division of sign relations into syntactics (relations of signs to each other), 
semantics (relations of signs to their objects) and pragmatics (relations of signs to their users) 
provides a resource for further terminology and understanding (Morris 1971). Lotman, 
especially in his methodology of what he selects as his research objects, pays most attention 
to relations between syntactics and semantics, as signs and their meanings are immanent to 
the text and outside of the interpreter. Pragmatics for Lotman is understood as the variance 
according to social function and interpretation of the text. Gibson, on the other hand, stresses 
the connection between semantics and pragmatics. A different definition of code provided by 
Timo Maran helps describe Gibson’s different emphasis, which is, “a system of 
correspondences between messages and their significance or behavioural outcomes” (Maran 
2012, 148). Syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics need to be combined for this material, as 
Lotman’s approach leaves out the physically constrained bodily attunements of the river 
guide, while Gibson’s approach in terms of syntactics does not get any more specific than the 
general label of hierarchical structure or nesting, which fails to analyse specific internal sign 
relations of particular, delimited environmental objects. Morris’ theory of signs on its own is 
also too general to use for this object, as it leaves out the important function of the 
demarcation and textuality of Shoshone. 
 One possible step toward combining Lotman and Gibson on this material is to 
differentiate two levels of pragmatic constraints on Shoshone as a text. At a greater level of 
abstraction, pragmatics frames semantics and syntactics (the latter two being the correlation 
of bodily actions with visually perceived forms on the river). The pragmatics at this level 
concern general physical capabilities of human beings, including vision and movement, as 
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well as the technology of the raft, the cultural influences of the activity, and local affordances 
of the river. All of these factors contribute to the specific route, or the totality of visual forms 
+ actions, through Shoshone as a whole. At this level of pragmatics, both cultural and natural 
constraints can be included without differentiating them into superficial categories of nature 
and culture. At a more concrete level would be situational pragmatics, which is where we can 
place Gibson’s notion of constant perception-learning or sensitisation. This situational level 
of pragmatics is more physically constrained than the general level of pragmatics. 
 Reading the river as a river guide combines a cultural practice and a functional 
perception of the environment. Shoshone as a text is a culturally mediated and partly 
arbitrary, while the perceptual and kinetic capabilities of the river guides develop increasing 
precision toward it over time through direct engagement with the river. Such a hybrid activity 
blurs the boundaries between cultural texts and direct perception of the environment, but 
opens up possibilities for combining the theories of Lotman and Gibson through the 
specification of a dual-levelled pragmatics. This contributes a step toward a research model 
for this activity, and potentially other similar activities involving human interaction with the 
environment. 
Conclusions 
 The aim of this research was two-fold: to discover similarities and differences 
between human perception of the environment and reading a cultural text, and to critically 
examine the usefulness of applying Lotman’s theory of text to perception of the environment. 
The first step of this research was the application of Lotman’s theory of text to the object of 
reading the river as a whitewater raft guide, in order to see which aspects of this theory are 
relevant and when. Based on the nature of the research object and a complementarity with 
Gibson’s research on perception of the environment, three basic features of Lotman’s theory 
of text were used: its demarcation, hierarchical structure, and realisation of a system of signs. 
This structural-semiotic approach is most useful for describing the habitualised cognitive side 
of reading the river, which appears most relevant at class three rapids and up, when previous 
visual inspection, planning, and setting up early are crucial. This level of river difficulty 
requires previous visual inspection and a specific route to be taken through the section, which 
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is also memorised as a cognitive map that enables guides to set up early on the river. One way 
to facilitate the memorisation of this route, as well as represent it in visual maps, diagrams, 
and verbal discourse, is to apply proper names to significant features of the river, which is 
demonstrated by Shoshone. 
 These features taken from Lotman’s theory of text reveal the importance of 
demarcation and text-system relations for this material, which adds to Gibson’s approach. 
Gibson’s more general notion of an invariant hierarchical structure, situationally extracted 
from the environment, does not attend to the internal sign relations of particular structures 
that are memorised and more fixed over time, especially those that carry cultural significance. 
Lotman’s approach, coming from a cultural semiotic perspective, studies the significance of 
particular bounded meaningful units that have their own internal structure, which appears also 
relevant for the case of Shoshone, whose structure cannot be described based purely on 
physically functional or situational needs, but is culturally mediated and thus partly arbitrary. 
On the other hand, an important difference from Lotman’s traditional applications of text, 
informed by Gibson’s theory, is that cultural texts have a greater potential for a variety of 
interpretation, as they are less physically and pragmatically constrained than the activity of 
moving through a river. Another related difference is the kinetic experience of whitewater 
rafting, which unites visual perception, cognition, and physical actions in a functional 
semiosis, which is unlike the reading of traditional texts in the context of literary studies. 
 The analysis of this object also revealed an important modification to be made to 
Lotman’s theory of text, which might be a step toward specifying his theory in relation to 
perception of the natural environment in general. This is a natural meta-sign, abstracted from 
the systematised water level of Shoshone. In other words, it is the regular impact on the text’s 
internal structure by the seasonality of the environment, or a recurring holistic change, which 
marks another important difference in the research object from traditional applications of text. 
Therefore, when applying Lotman’s notion of text to landscape, it is important to distinguish 
regular changes in the environment that result in a corresponding reorganisation of the text’s 
internal structure. This aspect deals with the systematicity of landscape perception, and meta- 
signs such as the water level may be one mechanism of recognising these regular changes. 
Other changes may lack actual meta-signs and simply occur as gradual qualitative changes of 
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content in the landscape that eventually crystallise into a different internal structure, which 
cyclically repeats itself. While this analysis focused on functional meaning only, other more 
phenomenological or symbolic meanings may also be altered by seasonality and meta-signs, 
and it may be promising to explore different types or layers of meanings connected to 
perception of a particular landscape. 
 The second approach in this paper took a closer look at the interaction between the 
theories of Gibson and Lotman on this material, noting the different role of the subject, 
different status and conceptualisation of learning, and different locus of meaning-generation 
in each theory. This prompted another change to Lotman’s theory of text, which is to take into 
account two levels of pragmatic constraint. The more abstract level acknowledges equally 
both cultural and physical constraints, such as the local affordances of the river, the 
technology of the raft, the general physical capabilities of human beings, the activity of river 
guiding, etc., and is notably different from pragmatics in Lotman’s traditional applications of 
text, which would be confined to the diversity of interpretation among readers. The general 
pragmatics associated with reading the river as a river guide are more fixed and abstract, 
framing the semantic and syntactic relations of Shoshone as a text. The situational level of 
pragmatics on the river is a more physical constraint that includes Gibson’s process of 
sensitisation. This level is more analogous to the level of interpretation of a cultural text, 
which can vary per individual and social group, as both sensitisation to the river and 
interpretation of a cultural text are influenced by skill. Sensitisation itself may not be 
describable with Lotmanian text-based semiotics, as this is an emergent and largely 
unconscious learning process and the theory of text deals with forms. The ad hoc 
epistemology of Tartu semiotics is one way to mediate the lack of attention to this level, 
which probably warrants a different metalanguage and methodology. 
 To sum everything up, Lotman’s basic theory of text was indeed useful in this analysis 
for describing mechanisms of cognitive river orientation as a river guide, in order to explicate 
similarities and differences between perception of the environment and reading a cultural 
text. A few extrasystemic additions to Lotman’s theory were necessary due to some of the 
differences, informed by both the object and by Gibson’s theory of direct perception of the 
environment. Morris’ notions of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics were used as a 
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reference point from which to compare the approaches of Lotman and Gibson, leading to a 
combination of their theories. Morris’ theory of signs alone was not used for this analysis 
because it is too general, as Lotman’s textual features of demarcation, hierarchical structure, 
and materialisation of a system of signs were found to be relevant for Shoshone, as were 
Gibson’s relations of subject and environment. The materialisation of Lotman’s theory of text 
in this analysis, resulting in the addition of the natural meta-sign and two different levels of 
pragmatic constraints, is a step toward a research model for this activity, which could hold 
potential for exploring other similar cases of human interaction with the environment. This 
contributes a semiotic perspective to the on-going search for methodology and research 
concepts in the environmental humanities, including the emerging field of ecosemiotics, 
while continuing the tradition of Tartu semiotics by expanding Lotman’s theory of text.  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Abstract: I present a response to Thure von Uexküll’s attempt to complement Jakob von 
Uexküll’s theories by incorporating concepts from structural linguistics. I more closely 
compare structural linguistics and Jakob von Uexküll’s theories, noting significant differences 
unmentioned by Thure von Uexküll, leading to the claim that Jakob von Uexküll’s theories 
need further development in relation to cognitive learning. I suggest that learning has a higher 
status and different conceptualization in a bio- or eco-semiotic approach than it does in 
structural linguistics. Bateson’s concepts of proto- and deutero-learning are found to be 
complementary to Jakob von Uexküll’s theory at the intra-specific level, while Hoffmeyer’s 
notions of semethic interaction and semiotic freedom are useful to describe interspecific 
relations and semiotic capacities of organisms.  
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Introduction  
 In his Introduction: The Sign Theory of Jakob von Uexküll, Thure von Uexküll (1992) 
argues that the laws of nature as described by Jakob von Uexküll are analogous to the 
structural laws of linguistics. He suggests that we borrow terminology from linguistics, such 
as “system, structure, unit, code, etc.” to provide more precision than the musical analogies 
Uexküll used for umwelt theory (T. v. Uexküll 1992: 286). After accepting the assumption 
that linguistic laws and the laws of nature are homomorphic, i.e. share a recurrent 
fundamental principle or form on different levels of complexity, he states, “[...] Saussure’s 
distinction between langue and parole (or the more general distinction between code and 
message) may be viewed as an illustration of Uexküll’s own distinction between an active 
plan and a concrete living phenomenon” (T. v. Uexküll 1992: 282, emphasis mine). 
Reflecting this idea that there is a general concept of code and message that can include 
language and J. v. Uexküll’s concept of plan, he relies most heavily on the general sign theory 
of Charles Morris (1971) to support his argument, and uses the human umwelt as the core of 
his comparison. When he does turn to the level of contrapuntal correlation or meaning rules, 
he refers only very briefly to Bertalanffy’s systems theory.  
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Building on some of T. v. Uexküll’s arguments, I compare the aim, methodology, notion 
of sign, and general explanation of meaning-generation of J. v. Uexküll’s theory with that of 
structural linguistics, using Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson as main 
representatives of this latter field. This comparison is aided is by Timo Maran’s (2012) 
description of ecological codes, which demonstrate the more ambiguous and fuzzy nature of 
ecological codes than the typical notion derived from linguistics and information theory. This 
reveals several important differences between structural linguistics and J. v. Uexküll’s 
theories, which lead me to suggest that the theory of the “composition of nature” needs 
further development in relation to cognitive learning, due to a greater role of the subject and 
relatedly, the different nature of ecological codes. Since J. v. Uexküll was responding to 
Darwin and his synchronic umwelt research was innovative at the time, it makes sense that he 
did not fully develop this phenomenon past his concept of plan, as it would be a much later 
step in the process of umwelt research. I argue that learning itself should take on a different 
status and conceptualization in the two different fields, and that Gregory Bateson’s concepts 
of proto- and deutero-learning are most complementary to Uexküll’s theory in a semiotic 
way.  
2.1. Two Different Systems of Thought  
 This section takes a “metasemiotic” perspective toward a comparison of structural 
linguistics and Uexküll’s umwelt theory.  The aim, methodology, notion of sign, and 3
explanation of meaning-generation, all interrelated and together comprising a general system 
of thought, differ significantly between these two fields. The aim of structural linguistics is to 
describe the hierarchical structure and function of the code. The methodology abstracts 
invariants from speech and it is these invariants that are most important, playing a dominant 
role to the subject, whose speech both realizes and is made possible by the code. As Saussure 
states, “The linguist must take the study of linguistic structure as his primary concern, and 
relate all other manifestations of language to it” (Saussure 2011 [1959]: 9). In a similar 
 Juri Lotman discerns two tendencies in semiotics: metasemiotics, where the objects of study are the 3
researchers’ “models of models”, and semiotics, where the object of study is at the level of culture, or “texts as 
such” (Lotman 1988: 52).
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manner, Roman Jakobson, being influenced by information theory, describes similarities 
between the fields of linguistics and communication theory, stating “Linguistic analysis [...] 
came to resolve oral speech into a finite series of elementary informational units. [...] Thus, 
form in language has a manifestly granular structure and is subject to quantal 
description” (Jakobson 1960: 570). The notion of sign, or meaningful element, is an arbitrary 
unit that is only intelligible in terms of differential value in relation to other units within a 
bounded hierarchical system (Saussure 2011 [1959]). Therefore, the methodology of 
structural linguistics appears to give greater ontological status to the code than the interpreter, 
in terms of explaining meaning-generation.  
The aim of Uexküll’s approach is to reconstruct the subjective universe of the organism 
under study. His methodology begins from an analysis of the umwelt of the human 
researcher, in order to understand our particular limits, the general nature of an umwelt, and 
“neutral objects” that have no direct functional meaning for the researcher, who can measure 
and manipulate such objects (T. v. Uexküll 1992: 297). Neutral objects are used to place the 
organism in the role of sign receiver and discover what forms of these objects the organism 
acts on, and how this organism acts on such forms, transforming them into a meaning-carrier. 
The researcher can manipulate and alter these signs in order to experimentally discover the 
nature of these forms for the organism. Discovering all of the forms and corresponding 
actions of the organism leads to a reconstruction of its umwelt, or its entire world of 
perception and action.  
Uexküll’s notion of an elementary sign is the active distinction between self and non-self, 
or “ego-quality”, placing greater emphasis on subjectivity and context-sensitivity (T. v. 
Uexküll 1992: 288). The minimal element is therefore a relation in space and time between 
subject and meaning-carrier. Therefore the subject is part of the structure of the sign, unlike in 
structural linguistics, where the sign is outside the speaker. This results in a comparatively 
greater ontological status of the subject for Uexküll than structural linguistics, in terms of its 
position in the explanation of meaning generation.  
2.2. Natures of Code  
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 Using Morris’ distinction of syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics, T. v. Uexküll 
(1992) provides a compelling argument for how Uexküll’s elementary sign processes of 
organizing and content signs, which are types of perceptual signs, can be supplemented with a 
concept of syntactical codes. I think this is easier to compare, first and more generally 
because perception itself is intra-specific, and therefore the notion of code is less fuzzy as it is 
species-bound. Second, he uses human perception in this comparison. Granted, he was 
following step one of umwelt research to analyze the subjective universe of the researcher. 
Studies in cognitive linguistics, human geography, landscape studies, and other fields have 
shown similar possibilities for drawing connections between human perception or embodied 
experience and language or conception (Lakoff, Johnson 1999; Duncan, Duncan 2010; Spirn 
1998). I agree with his use of Charles Morris here, as it shows how similarities between 
human language and perception can be discovered with a more general theory of signs. 
However, Maran (2012) notes that messages in animals are not as systemic as they are in 
human language, as spatio-temporal context largely determines the expressions and 
interpretations of an animal. This is a key point further on when we turn to learning.  
Things get more complicated when considering T. v. Uexküll’s (1992) claim that J. v. 
Uexküll’s concept of plan is analogous to Saussure’s concept of langue. He does not develop 
this statement in the article. When he later discusses the level contrapuntal correlation, he 
loosely ties it to Bertalanffy’s systems theory instead. He notes a few differences between the 
two later on, notably that language is dialogical and a shared code, while biological sign 
processes are monological. Another difference he states multiple times is that language is 
culturally acquired while biological laws are innate. This difference seems less relevant at the 
ecological level, and in my opinion, Maran points out other aspects of ecological codes that 
illustrate more important differences.  
First it is important to define what we mean by code. One definition mentioned by Maran 
is that a code is a “system of correspondences between messages and their significance or 
behavioral outcomes” (Maran 2012: 148). We could use Morris’ theory of signs as a reference 
point by saying that this definition of code connects semantics to pragmatics, while in 
structural linguistics, the notion of code connects syntactics to semantics. Maran also 
references Kalevi Kull’s definition of ecological code as a starting point. Kull states, 
!46
“Ecological code (as introduced, e.g. by Alexander Levich around 1977, see Levich 1983) 
can be defined as the sets of (sign) relations (regular irreducible correspondences) 
characteristic to an entire ecosystem, including the interspecific relations in particular” (Kull 
2010: 354). Maran develops this definition by outlining three main properties of ecological 
codes that differentiate them from linguistic codes. 
The first property of ecological codes is that they are “distributed and open” (Maran 2012: 
150). Because they include multiple species with different umwelten, no single organism or 
species has full perception of an ecological code as humans do with language. New species 
can become incorporated in the ecological code in unpredictable ways, which makes this 
code subject to change. As is seen further on in connection to learning, Jakobson states that 
the structure of a linguistic code exhibits no change over time, despite changes in verbal style 
and vocabulary. The second difference is that ecological codes are specific to a local 
community, comprised of the regularities, habits and constraints of all organisms combined. 
As opposed to the arbitrary nature of linguistic sign relations, an ecological code consists of 
indexical sign relations that transcend the cognitive capacities of any particular observer. The 
third difference is that ecological codes are stored in different forms of memory, both 
conscious and unconscious. This includes the physical form of organisms, their genetic 
memory, and the cultural memories of species. This is why I consider T. v. Uexküll’s 
distinction that linguistic codes are culturally acquired while biological codes are innate to be 
less relevant at this level.  
Maran concludes by suggesting that ecological codes do not resemble systemic codes 
such as language, but are more like “archetypal imagery or patterns — dispositions in animals 
to establish certain types of meaning relations in ecological communities and to link sign 
processes with actions in particular ways” (Maran 2012: 151). This archetypal imagery, 
inspired by Carl Jung, is meant to be a fuzzy, interspecific pattern that cannot be localized in 
the umwelt of a single species. He gives an example of the archetype of fear, which can be 
described across species in both general sign characteristics, such as unfamiliarity, 
unexpectedness, or sudden change, and more specific features such as images of eyes or 
fangs, large body size, low and loud sounds, and fast-moving shadows (Maran 2012: 153).  
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Describing these abstract forms and dispositions in animals is an interesting and fruitful 
approach to ecological codes, and it could be complemented by further development of the 
processes through which these dispositions are formed and change. This involves focusing on 
the open nature of ecological codes, as well as the “habitual semiosis, behavior, and action of 
animals” he notes in the second property of ecological codes (Maran 2012: 150). He points 
out that Jesper Hoffmeyer has attended to this with his concept of semethic interaction, which 
I later return to, but now I turn to the status and conceptualization of learning in structural 
linguistics in order to demonstrate that learning plays a much more important role for 
ecological codes, and should also be conceptualized differently. 
2.3. The Status and Conceptualizations of Learning  
 Based on the ad hoc epistemology advocated by Tartu semiotics, and often employed 
in semiotics in general, I argue that learning should have a higher status when studying 
ecological codes, or Nature’s composition in J. v. Uexküll’s terms, than it does in structural 
linguistics. This is so because of the greater importance of the subject, the locality and 
fluidity of ecological codes, and the fact that the subject does not have perception of the 
whole code. Learning in structural linguistics is confined to a specific stage of development, 
and Jakobson argues that metalingual operations are key for learning language and for 
clarifying semantics in various contexts (Jakobson 1956). The metalinguistic function of 
language involves conscious or unconscious referral to the code. Jakobson notes that while 
verbal styles, vocabulary, and phraseology change over time, “[...] no progress whatever has 
been detected [...]” in the morphological and syntactic system, as well as the overall 
phonemic system (Jakobson 1967: 104). Therefore, once this code is learned during 
childhood, there is relatively little more learning to do, and participants have little impact on 
changing the nature of this code. Although metalingual operations are important for context-
sensitive semantics, they are still considered to be one of the six functions of the code of 
language, confined to possibilities enabled by the system. However, because ecological codes 
are ambiguous and changing, the subject’s own experience and decisions become much more 
important for the nature of this code and warrants a framework for studying the process of 
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learning. It could be argued ultimately that learning is constant in an ecosystem, and is 
partially constitutive of an ecological code.  
It is important to define what we mean by learning as well, because there are many 
different conceptualizations of learning across time and academic disciplines. When learning 
language in structural linguistics, this type of learning is implicitly considered to be the 
transmission of abstract knowledge, a more traditional concept of learning derived from 
classical structural analysis (Hanks 1991). Another term for this concept of learning is 
“objectivism” (Bourdieu 1990: 26). When it comes to ecological codes, theories such as 
Bourdieu’s habitus, Jean Lave’s situated learning, and Tim Ingold’s dwelling perspective, 
seem much more suitable, because they all emphasize the conditions in which learning occurs 
(whether individual, social, or environmental), as well as the collaborative nature of learning. 
These conditions and relations play a greater role than any abstract invariants considered to 
be the content of learning. Ingold uses a recipe book as an example, stating that this code is 
not itself knowledge, but that it “opens up a path to knowledge, thanks to its location within a 
taskscape that is already partially familiar by virtue of previous experience” (Ingold 2001: 
22). Bourdieu (1990) points out another interesting part of the process — the tendency for the 
habitus to seek the conditions in which it arose, unconsciously embodying past experience. 
However, these theories lack the precision of a semiotic metalanguage as they are very 
general, describing the process and its tendencies at the level of the whole. Therefore, 
Gregory Bateson’s framework for learning is closer to a semiotic approach, providing 
different types in terms of recognition by the subject. This best addresses the intraspecific and 
individual level of cognitive learning, and how this is one possible underlying process 
shaping the composition of Nature.  
2.4. Toward Complementing Uexküll’s Theory with Intra- and Interspecific Learning  
 While Bateson describes learning in terms of a logical hierarchy, at the most basic 
level i.e. proto-learning, learning is equated with regular sign processing. He states that this is 
“the simple receipt of information from an external event, in such a way that a similar event 
at a later (and appropriate) time [or context] will convey the same information” (Bateson 
2000 [1972]: 284). He states this in other words as “a situation in which a subject receives a 
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message and acts appropriately on it” (Bateson 2000 [1972]: 204). At this most basic level, 
learning parallels J. v. Uexküll’s model of functional cycle. For example, a moth hears the 
tone of a bat and learns that an enemy is near. Higher levels of learning function to enable the 
processing of sign types or categorization, which is itself a learned skill. Deutero-learning is a 
concept that refers to the subject’s learning of the particular contexts in which proto-learning 
occurs. Deutero-learning may complement J. v. Uexküll’s notions of circles (food circle, 
medium circle, etc.) and functional tones of the meaning carrier. It is important to note, 
however, that Uexküll did not distinguish circle from cycle in the German language (der 
Kreis). This distinction is a fruitful one to develop as it enables the description of sign types 
distinguished by the organism, and therefore deutero-learning. Uexküll hints at this ability in 
an English translation of A stroll through the worlds of animals and men: a picture book of 
invisible worlds, when he uses the word “attitude” of the subject to explain the possibility of 
different functional tones, meaning different life stages or dispositions of the subject (Uexküll 
1992 [1934]: 373). He also discusses, in A Theory of Meaning, those cases where the “carrier 
of meaning does not change in the least but, in spite of that, experiences the opposite 
treatment from the subject, because the latter has switched itself to receive another 
meaning” (Uexküll 2010 [1940]: 176). Such cases can be partially explained by the 
recognition by the subject of a new context, or deutero-learning.  
While Uexküll notes how the umwelt “grows within the individual life span of every 
animal that is able to gather experiences” (Uexküll 1992 [1934]: 359), creating new 
functional tones, he describes this as a growing into Nature’s plan, and focuses primarily on 
developmental processes and corresponding morphological changes. Bateson’s hierarchical 
distinction can complement his work by accounting for two different levels of cognitive 
learning that contribute to the composition of Nature. What might still be needed is an 
account of the unpredictable nature of perception and action that increases in more complex 
organisms and contributes to the fluidity, locality, and openness of ecological codes. 
Accidents, mistakes, and environmental changes (probably often enacted by humans) also 
contribute to change in ecological codes, which would require flexibility and adaptive 
capacities of species in order to maintain the integrity of the ecosystem.  
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J. v. Uexküll hints at the importance of learning for the composition of Nature in his use 
of musical analogies, and his mentioning that the laws of nature continue to develop. 
Hoffmeyer’s notion of semethic interaction may be another useful counterpart to Uexküll’s 
theory of the composition of Nature, as it describes how multiple species create new relations 
together, each one having only partial access to the entire relational complex or ecological 
code, but each one affecting this code through their dynamic interaction. This brings us to the 
level of interspecific learning. “Semethic interactions” are the recognition of any regular 
behaviors or habits as signs by other organisms (Hoffmeyer 2008: 189). Hoffmeyer provides 
an explanatory counterpart to this description. As the biochemical rule states that any store of 
energy will always wind up being consumed by a species, he argues that any regularity or 
habit will become a sign for another individual or species, which can be quite complex by 
incorporating several different species (Hoffmeyer 2008). He provides an example of a 
certain caterpillar that begins eating the leaves of a corn seedling. Something in its saliva 
causes the formation of a signal that spreads to the entire plant, which responds by emitting a 
volatile compound that is carried away by the wind. Female wasps, which lay their eggs in 
such caterpillars, recognize this compound as a sign for oviposition, and follow the trace to its 
source. They lay their eggs there, which hatch a couple of days later and eat the inside of the 
caterpillar, eventually killing it. Therefore, the habit of the caterpillar (part of its saliva) is 
recognized by the plant, leading to another habit (the emission of a volatile compound) that is 
recognized by the wasp, leading to its own habit (laying eggs in the caterpillars), which 
results in a cooperation between the wasp and the plant. This example shows the complicated 
interplay between different species’ umwelten, or the relations at the level of the ecosystem. 
To use his words, the advantage or disadvantage of a trait “depends on a complex, self-
organizing context of semiotic relations that were gradually established through massively 
combinatorial trial and error events at the lived ecosemiotic level [...]” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 
198). He argues that these synchronic, semiotic relations are most responsible for maintaining 
the stability of the ecological and biogeographical patterns of Earth (Hoffmeyer 2008: 190).  
Another important notion of his is semiotic freedom, which he defines as a logical depth 
of meaning, or “the number of calculatory steps spent upon producing it” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 
187). This varies in degrees across different species. For example, a bird that pretends its 
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wing is broken in order to lure a predator away from its nest has a higher degree of semiotic 
freedom than bacteria that choose to swim toward a source of nutrients. Hoffmeyer argues 
that evolution need not be characterized by the increasing multiplicity of morphological 
structures, but rather by an increase in semiotic freedom, which has an “inherent tendency to 
grow” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 186). This notion is important because semiotic freedom may be 
one way in which organisms may adapt to changing environments, or one way in which they 
change or create their environments.  
Conclusion  
 Because linguistic codes (in structural linguistics) are less open to change by subjects 
than ecosystems are, learning plays a different role and is conceptualized differently. The 
method of abstracting invariants in structural linguistics is more useful when the nature of the 
code is more fixed and shared by the participants, and learning is the transmission of this 
code. Uexküll’s theory provides a great starting point for ecosemiotics, though the 
composition of Nature could also be partially explained by processes of cognitive learning, 
which would move it farther away from the field of structural linguistics. Ecological learning 
cannot simply be a transmission of an abstract code, as no single individual or species has 
access to it. Instead it is realized in dynamic inter-specific relations through selective action 
and habituation, which vary according to time and space, and could be generally described as 
self-organization at the ecosystemic level. Bateson’s proto and deutero-learning provide a 
useful typology at the intraspecific level to account for the less systemic nature of animal 
communication mentioned by Maran, which is largely dependent on spatial and temporal 
context. As a specific development of the notion of self-organization, semethic interaction 
contributes an explanation for both general functioning and diachronic changes at the level of 
the ecosystem. These theories help show how cognitive changes as part of the organism’s 
ontogeny can complement Uexküll’s theory of the composition of Nature.  
More development is probably needed to describe different types of learning processes, as 
well as different stages or levels of learning. T. v. Uexküll suggests we bridge the human and 
natural sciences by applying terminology from structural linguistics to umwelt theory, but 
perhaps a better route would be to develop a semiotic metalanguage for describing patterns 
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other than rigid hierarchical structures, that unfold in time and can account for the ecological 
level. This partially explains why Clause Emmeche and Jesper Hoffmeyer turned from 
Saussure’s theories to those of Peirce in biosemiotics in 1990, because Peirce’s structure of 
the sign implies a subject who effects an interpretant, and he also developed a theory of 
habituation as well as a theory of the evolution of natural laws. However, it seems very 
difficult to find tools for describing emergent processes, as semiotics deals primarily with 
forms. So far it seems like our only options are to either describe this process in general, such 
as the case with concepts like habitus, situated learning, semethic interaction, or sensitization, 
or we can divide it into discrete stages or levels, where Bateson’s typology falls. Jakob von 
Uexküll musical analogies may not have been so far off in this sense in their vagueness, 
because Thure von Uexküll’s suggestion of further precision with terms from structural 
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Vahetu keskkonnataju semiootiline modelleerimine: keskkond kui tekst ja selle loomine 
õppimise läbi 
Kokkuvõte 
Käesolev töö, mis koosneb kahest artiklist ja neid raamivast sissejuhatusest, tegeleb 
keskkonna otsese tajumise modelleerimisega kahel eesmärgil: esiteks, kasutamaks sidusat 
metodoloogilist lähenemist semiootiliste mudelite proovilepanekuks ja ümbertöötamiseks, ja 
teiseks, et arendada teemavaldkonda edasi, täpsustades otsese taju uurimiseks tarvilikke 
semiootilisi mõisteid. Otsese taju määratles James J. Gibson (1986) ökoloogilise 
psühholoogia jaoks keskkonna vahetu tajumisena, vastandina sümboliliste kujutiste poolt 
vahendatud tajule, olgu nendeks vahendajateks pildid, suusõnalised kirjeldused ja narratiivid, 
või ka meie taju võimendavad abivahendid, nagu mikroskoobid ja teleskoobid. 
 Esimene artikkel analüüsib konkreetse, omaette nimega jõelõigu tajumist kärestikul 
parvetamise giidi funktsionaalsest vaatenurgast. Artiklis rakendatakse eksperimentaalselt Juri 
Lotmani varast teksti-mõistet suhtes Gibsoni strukturaalse lähenemisega visuaalsele tajule, 
ning muudetakse metakeelt uue uurimisobjekti kontekstis, lisades sinna mõistena loomuliku 
meta-märgi, mis annab seletuse muutuvale veetasemele. Teine artikkel keskendub taju 
üldisemale tasandile, kaasates mitmeid eri liike, ning uurib erinevate mõistete 
rakendusvõimalusi, mis pärit strukturaallingvistikast Uexkülli omailma teooriani. See artikkel 
uurib õppimise rolli ja mõistet alternatiivse arenguliinina, rakendades selleks 
komplementaarseid, Gregory Batesonilt pärinevaid proto- ja deutero-õppimise mõisteid. 
 Mõlemad artiklid tarvitavad ad hoc lähenemist, mida peetakse keskseks Tartu-Moskva 
semiootikale ja mis annab eksplitsiitse hinnangu eri teooriate relevantsusele ning võtab nad 
omaks dialoogis uute uurimisobjektidega. Tööd raamivas sissejuhatuses esitatavad järeldused 
määratlevad otsese taju konteksti jaoks täpsemalt mõisted märk, kood, õppimine ja meta-
märk. Töö struktuuri tervikuna võib kujutleda kontsentriliste ringidena, kus sissejuhatus on 
kõige suurem ring, olles kõige abstraktsem. Teine, teoreetiline artikkel semiootilistest 
tajumudelitest, oleks keskmine ring, ning esimene artikkel, käies liigispetsiifiliselt just 
inimeste kohta ja omades konkreetset uurimisobjekti, oleks kõige väiksem ring. 
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